Book Review: Nazis in Skokie: Freedom, Community, and the First Amendment. by Donald Alexander Downs. by Garvey, John H.




Book Review: Nazis in Skokie: Freedom,
Community, and the First Amendment. by Donald
Alexander Downs.
John H. Garvey
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Garvey, John H., "Book Review: Nazis in Skokie: Freedom, Community, and the First Amendment. by Donald Alexander Downs."
(1986). Constitutional Commentary. 497.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/497
462 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:457 
ing, but fortunately the errors are minor ones that do not confuse 
Levy's line of argument. 
NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT. By Donald Alexander 
Downs.1 Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame 
Press. 1985. Pp. xii, 227. $20.00. 
John H. Garvey2 
There have only been two significant events in the life of the 
group libel doctrine: the 1952 decision in Beauharnais v. Illinois 
and the litigation arising out of the Nazis' attempt to march in Sko-
kie, Illinois in 1977. We are now accustomed to think of Beauhar-
nais as a derelict, cast off by the Supreme Court in New York Times 
v. Sullivan. This book argues that it would be unwise to abandon 
the concept of group libel, and that a properly limited rule against 
racial vilification would forbid expression such as the Nazi march. 
The Nazis (thirty to fifty of them) wanted to march up and 
down for half an hour in front of the Skokie Village Hall on a Sun-
day afternoon, to protest an ordinance requiring demonstrators to 
carry insurance. They said they would carry signs with catchy slo-
gans like "White Free Speech" and, more to the point, they would 
wear storm-trooper uniforms with swastika armbands. Most of 
Skokie's residents are Jewish, and many are survivors of persecution 
by Hitler's regime. The Nazis stirred things up in advance with 
some vile leaflets announcing their coming. Frank Collin, their 
leader, told Professor Downs that 
I used it [the first amendment] at Skokie. I planned the reaction of the Jews. They 
[were] hysterical. 
The Village sued in a state court to enjoin the march on the 
theory that it would cause distress to the Jewish population, incite 
religious hatred, and provoke violent retaliation. This ultimately 
failed.J The Village also enacted three ordinances to provide more 
I. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison. 
2. Wendell Cherry Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. 
3. In the Cook County circuit court the Village got an injunction that forbade the 
Nazis to march in uniform, display the swastika, or distribute materials that would incite 
religious hatred. The Supreme Court ordered the state appellate courts either to allow an 
expedited appeal or to stay the injunction. National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 
(1977). The Illinois Appellate Court then modified the injunction to forbid only display of 
the swastika. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 51 Ill. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 
347 (1977). After some more wrangling about a stay (see National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 
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permanent protection: (1) a permit system for public assemblies; 
(2) a criminal prohibition against dissemination of material which 
incites racial or religious hatred; and (3) a criminal prohibition 
against political demonstrations by people wearing military 
uniforms. The federal courts held all these invalid.4 In the end, 
though, the Nazis retreated and marched elsewhere. 
I 
Downs does not defend the Skokie ordinances, which he says 
forbade too much speech. But he argues that a more limited rule 
would be all right. In his view, racial vilification causes harms that 
outweigh the free speech benefits of such expression. Those harms 
occur, he argues, only when the vilification is "targeted" at an indi-
vidual or a specific group (like the Jews in Skokie). 
The best part of Downs's book is his collection and assessment 
of data devoted to the former of these two propositions: that the 
harms of racist expression outweigh the free speech benefits. To 
make that point Downs interviewed more than thirty of the partici-
pants in the controversy. These included members of the commu-
nity of Jewish survivors, Skokie residents and political leaders, 
representatives of concerned groups in and outside the village (the 
Anti-Defamation League, the Jewish Federation in Chicago, the 
Northwest Suburban Synagogue Council, Skokie United Presbyte-
rian Church, etc.), Nazi leader Frank Collin, and the American 
Civil Liberties Union officers and lawyers most involved in repre-
senting him. 
What Downs draws from these interviews is a rather sensitive 
assessment of the effects of the conflict. Chief among the harms is 
the emotional trauma suffered by the survivors. Skokie's corporate 
counsel said: 
I knew these people well, and never recalled any conversations about their 
experiences in the death camps. They were regular citizens before this. On this 
date, however, they were changed people: fanatical, irrational, frightened, angry. 
No one could possibly appeal to them with any reasonable argument. When we 
told them at noon that Collin had been served an injunction, many refused to be-
434 U.S. 1327 (Stevens, Circuit Justice 1977)), the Illinois Supreme Court held even that 
provision unconstitutional. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 
N.E.2d 21 (1978). 
A parallel state court action for similar relief was brought by a class of Nazi holocaust 
survivors. The circuit court gave the plaintiffs no relief, however, and the appeals produced 
no opinions. Certiorari was denied on the same day the Supreme Court disposed of the 
federal litigation. Goldstein v. Collin, 439 U.S. 910 (1978). 
4. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 
1978), application for stay of mandate denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 
(1978). 
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lieve us. Many stayed until five o'clock, chanting loudly, etc. It would take a psy-
chiatrist to understand the impact. There seemed to be different states of being: 
catatonia, frenzy, etc. They were possessed, some of them. It was as if they had 
repressed something for twenty years that was now loose. It was very disturbing. 
In addition to the feeling of terror there was, particularly 
among the survivors of Hitler's Europe, a conviction that commu-
nity protection had broken down and a sense of societal incivility. 
And in the background there was a very real threat that violence 
would occur if the march ever took place. 
On the other hand the conflict produced significant benefits of 
the kind that free speech theorists typically envision. This was true 
even for the survivors themselves. There was nothing Collin and 
his pals could teach them about nazism, but Downs argues convinc-
ingly that for some of them the incident produced real self-
development: a sense of mastery over the Nazi terror in their past, 
and a new willingness to participate in public life. 
Other participants did learn new things about nazism and anti-
Semitism, and for that matter about the pros and cons of freedom of 
speech. Moreover, the affair caused a political mobilization by the 
larger Jewish community that outlasted Collin's threat to march. 
According to Downs, "The local (Midwest) ADL, the National 
American Jewish Congress, and the National Jewish Community 
Relations Advisory Council ... revised their established quarantine 
policies in favor of selective confrontations designed to support the 
community." Downs also speculates that the active resistance to 
the Skokie march will deter some other hatemongers. 
Downs's proposal for balancing these harms and benefits is 
somewhat confusing. There are two reasons for this. The first is 
that he deals with too many principles; the second is that his meth-
odology-what he's doing with these harms and benefits-is a little 
unclear. 
First, as to principles. Professor Downs believes that we have 
gone overboard (not a lot, but a little) in protecting speech at the 
expense of other social values. He uses more than half a dozen pairs 
of principles drawn from various sources to make this point: 
( 1) "Republican virtue" /"community security." The former 
he uses to stress the positive aspects of free speech ("citizen partici-
pation in political matters" and so on); the latter the need for pro-
tection against assault and incivility. 
(2) "Procedural justice" /"substantive justice." The former 
term is meant to describe aspects of current free speech doctrine 
such as the rule of content neutrality. (Downs likens this to the due 
process revolution in administrative law and criminal procedure.) 
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The latter term refers to a community interest in morality and 
civility. 
(3) The "free speech principle" /the "harm principle." The 
former is Frederick Schauer's explanation of the scope and strength 
of the first amendment guarantee.s The latter is a modified version 
of Kant's principle of ultimate ends in the Foundations of the Meta-
physics of Morals. I will say more of this below. 
(4) "Procedural equality"/"substantive equality." This con-
trast is not entirely clear, but it may describe the rights of speaker 
and victim, respectively, to equal dignity. A rule that treats all 
speakers equally without regard to the content of their speech (pro-
cedural equality), even if they use fighting words, violates the tar-
get's right to equal dignity (substantive equality). 
(5) The principle of "analysis"/the principle of "synthesis." 
The former Downs likens to "the principle of libertarian individual-
ism," which controls current free speech law; the latter "recognizes 
the individual as a social person." 
(6) "Individualism"/"communitarianism." This seems to be 
a way of explaining the last pair. 
(7) The "ethic of ultimate ends" /the "ethic of responsibil-
ity."6 The former term does not match up exactly with the first 
term in each of the other pairs, but the "ethic of responsibility" is 
another way of describing the need for community security, sub-
stantive justice, the harm principle, and so on. As Downs puts it: 
"The ethic of responsibility, which Weber contrasts with the puris-
tic ethic of ultimate ends, is premised on the need to modify ideals 
and values in the face of their ethically relevant consequences in the 
real world." 
A man I once worked for told me that the world is divided into 
two kinds of people-those who see everything as falling into two 
categories, and those who don't. If so, Downs is of the former sort. 1 
I am of the latter. I think the harm principle that Downs proposes 
is useful. But many of the other pairs he lines up are undeveloped, 
redundant, and shed only the dimmest light on the problem of ra-
cial vilification. One may find instances of "procedural justice" in 
modem administrative law and criminal procedure, but thinking 
5. F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982). 
6. See generally Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: EssAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 
77-128 (H. Gerth & C. Mills ed. 1946). 
7. He exhibits the same trait in describing the benefits that the Skokie conflict had for 
survivor-participants. These are described by means of the following pairs of principles: 
(i) "patiens"/"agens" (Erik Erikson); (ii) "bare existence"/"independent self-consciousness" 
(Hegel); (iii) the "colonized"/the "full statute of a man" (Albert Memmi and Frantz Fanon); 
(iv) abolitionist policies/blacks standing up for their own rights (A.I. Melden). 
466 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:462 
about such instances does not help me see why the courts are in a 
muddle over Beauharnais. And Downs says better in his own 
words what Roberto Unger's principles of "analysis" and "synthe-
sis" are supposed to tell me. The other problem with all these prin-
ciples is that there are so many you don't take any of them seriously 
after a while, and that's too bad if one of them has something to say. 
Second, as to methodology. The principles that Downs lists 
reflect interests and values bearing on the formulation of a rule for 
dealing with the problem of group libel. But it is sometimes unclear 
how he is deploying these pieces en route to his final proposal. One 
approach he seems to suggest is to balance the harms and benefits 
from that class of speech, and come up with a general rule. This is 
what one expects after the long discussion of harms and benefits 
from the Nazis' proposed march in Skokie. The result of Professor 
Downs's balancing is a rule that favors the victim's interest. This is 
not surprising in light of the "teleological" theory of "communitari-
anism" that Downs endorses, or at least sees as a good to be 
achieved along with the good of "individualism." 
Another approach Downs proposes is to resolve the conflict 
between speaker and target by resort to "the principle of direct 
harm" derived from Kant's principle of ultimate ends. Kant's prin-
ciple, however, is not "teleological" but deontological: what ulti-
mately counts is not a net balance of goods (like community 
security) but the categorical duty not to treat another person as a 
means. Thus: 
[In the case of targeted racial vilification] the autonomy and self-government princi-
ples do not apply because of our application of the Kantian principle of ultimate 
ends of cases of direct harm. Any long-range benefit that might result from targeted 
racial vilification cannot justify its expression because of the direct harm which re-
sults. (Emphases in original.). 
[S)uch harms cannot be justified by the social utility of the speech because then the 
targets would be treated as the means of large societal First Amendment ends. (Em-
phases in original.). 
Downs would modify Kant's principle so that it comes into play 
only where the harm is "direct," i.e., intentionally caused to identi-
fiable individuals. But that only limits the range of the principle, 
not its categorical force within the area where it applies. As the 
quotations above indicate, direct harm is not to be balanced against 
"societal first amendment" benefits. 
This curious melange of balancing and categorical rules may 
seem somewhat familiar to students of the first amendment. It is a 
respectable imitation of the process of definitional balancing. The 
interesting thing about Downs's version is that he ends up in about 
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the same place as Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, but by reasoning in 
the opposite direction. The usual approach is to begin with a broad 
free speech right ("All categories of expression are covered") and 
then lop off those categories such as fighting words that are too far 
from the center of first amendment purposes to justify the harm 
they cause. Downs, by contrast, begins with the right of the victims 
(always to be treated "as an end in himself, not merely as a means") 
and then lops off those "indirect" harms that are as a practical mat-
ter too far from the center of Kant's concerns to justify a restriction 
on free speech. In the end he too says that "insulting or 'fighting' 
words" can be forbidden. 
II 
Definitional balancing has one point in its favor that Downs's 
approach does not: the right to freedom of speech is explicitly pro-
tected by the Constitution; Kant's right to be treated as an end is 
not. Kant's right, as modified by Downs, is what we usually treat in 
first amendment computations as a "state interest"-the kind of 
thing that can be "legitimate," "important," "substantial," or even 
"compelling." What I like about Downs's backwards approach to 
group libel is that he feels around a part of the elephant that we 
don't usually address. We know much about categories of speech 
(commercial speech, libel, obscenity) and types of abridgement 
(content regulation, time, place, and manner restrictions) but, like 
Justice Blackmun,9 I'm not sure I can tell a legitimate from a com-
pelling state interest. Professor Downs at least gives an example of 
each (indirect harm, direct harm), offers some distinguishing char-
acteristics (direct harm is intentionally inflicted and intimidating), 
and proposes a justification for considering something compelling 
(Kant's principle, as modified). 
Downs is right about Kant's principle, at least to this extent: I 
believe most of us would find it a sufficient reason for limiting a 
constitutionally protected liberty that one is maliciously using it to 
cause harm to a specific person. That is the reason why we tolerate 
restrictions on libel (even public figures can't be falsely and deliber-
ately defamed), invasion of privacy, residential picketing, demon-
strations on private property, and ambulance chasing. And our 
inability to point to specific people who are harmed is part of the 
trouble we have with obscenity, and so on. Group libel law tradi-
tionally has punished behavior that is more like obscenity or sedi-
8. More precisely, the duty of the speaker. 
9. Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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tious talk than libel: it has always been hard to say precisely who is 
hurt, and how. The danger, in other words, tends to be conjectural, 
long-term, and diffuse. Downs takes a step in the right direction by 
arguing that racial vilification should be forbidden only when it is 
"targeted" at "an individual or specified group" of limited size. By 
"targeted" he means either addressed to ("You are a ") or 
expressed about ("X is a ") a specific person or group. 
But it isn't enough, according to Downs's argument, that 
speech be targeted at a specific person or group. The modified 
Kantian principle also requires that the speech cause harm of a 
"substantial" nature. In order for the principle to serve a useful 
role in first amendment analysis, there must be general agreement 
about what it means to "cause" harm and about what harms are 
"substantial." Although the book contends that racial vilification 
always causes the requisite harm, I am not convinced. 
There are perhaps four kinds of harm that group libel can 
cause. The first is provocation to violence, by the target group (as 
in Chaplinsky) or a sympathetic audience (as in Beauharnais and 
Brandenburg). Lawyers nowadays usually feel that this is the only 
harm that justifies control of racial slurs, whether directed at groups 
(Beauharnais) or individuals (Chaplinsky). But in most cases of 
group libel, physical violence doesn't occur. Given our constitu-
tional bias in favor of free speech, the bare possibility of violence 
does not support a flat rule against racial vilification. Instead it sup-
ports something like a clear and present danger rule, which requires 
an appraisal of the danger in each case. That is in fact the current 
constitutional rule for cases in which the government tries to justify 
suppression of speech on this ground. 
An additional causation problem afflicts many "provocation to 
violence" cases. Assume, for example, that the march had occurred 
in Skokie and had provoked residents to violence. The problem is 
that the Nazis gave warning of when they would come and what 
they would say. The targets' decision to attend would therefore 
have been voluntary. It would also have been understandable; but if 
they reacted violently it would be hard to say that they were not 
responsible for their own actions. 
The targets' emotional distress is a second kind of harm that 
may be caused by group libel. Downs argues that the Nazis' pro-
posed march inflicted a special kind of mental torment on holocaust 
survivors in Skokie, and that this harm surpasses the lower bound 
he sets for the Kantian principle. I agree, but I don't think Downs 
will convince people who don't. We lack a universally accepted rule 
for identifying compelling harms (as we have the Constitution for 
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identifying some fundamental and not-so-fundamental liberties). 
Professor Downs uses two methods to remedy this deficiency. One 
is simple intuition-he presents hypothetical examples of harms 
above and below the line, and assumes that the reader's moral sense 
will sort them in the same way. An obvious problem with this 
method is that not everyone has the same intuition. Franklyn 
Haiman, for one, would disagree with all of Downs's hypotheti-
cals.w The second method is the common law of torts, which is a 
kind of social statement that certain harms are compensable and 
other are not. Downs points to the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress as communal recognition of the fact that this 
kind of harm justifies control of behavior. Unfortunately, the com-
mon law does not tell us how emotional distress registers on the 
relevant scale. A mere "legitimate" interest in compensating harm 
suffices to justify most tort causes of action. For first amendment 
purposes, by contrast, we need to know whether the interest in 
preventing emotional distress is "substantial" or "compelling." 
There is another problem with justifying a flat rule against ra-
cial vilification by reference to the targets' extreme emotional dis-
tress. It will be a rare case where each member of a large group--or 
even an individual, unless he is specially vulnerable-suffers that 
kind of harm. What made the Nazis' Skokie march a hard case was 
not that it would traumatize Jews generally, nor even Jews in Sko-
kie, but Jewish survivors of the holocaust. The only harm that nec-
essarily occurs in the ordinary case is of a different type. 
A third type of harm might be called "offense": irritation, dis-
gust, embarrassment, and the like. This might be one way of char-
acterizing the harm suffered by native-born Jews (and maybe also 
by non-Jews) in Skokie, and generally by those to whom racial epi-
thets are addressed. There is no bright line separating "offense" 
from "emotional distress," but the mental state is sometimes quite 
different and deserves separate treatment.'' 
My intuition and the law of torts tell me that Downs should be 
able with impunity to dismiss my review by saying, "It figures; 
10. See F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 95, 97, 146 (1981). Downs 
suggests, for example, that it would cause harm above the line to circulate leaflets saying, 
"Jew Greed Pockets Another Commission: Kike Keefe Cashes in on Families' Homes." Cj 
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). Haiman disagrees ("crafty 
jews," "Kosher Coon"). Downs says it would cause harm above the line for a group of 
twenty demonstrators to stand outside the home of a black family " 'chanting in a low tone, 
... mak[ing] almost no sound at all.' " Haiman says that "(i]f they are there for an hour or 
so, it would be just as easy for residents of the home to avoid looking out the window or to 
pull their shades." Haiman also argues against restriction of speech in the Skokie case. 
II. See J. FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 69-109 (1980); 
Vandeveer, Coercive Restraint of Offensive Actions, 8 PHIL. & PuB. AFFAIRS 175 (1979). 
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Garvey's a dumb mick." But Downs treats this as he does the de-
liberate infliction of emotional distress. His rule would allow me to 
sue for damages (or perhaps initiate criminal proceedings) because 
that comment (1) ... explicitly demeans ... through reference to 
... ethnicity ... and (2) such expression and harm are intended by 
the speaker ... and (3) such expression is directed at an individual 
... in such a way as to single out an individual ... as the definite 
target of the expression. 
It would be nice if people didn't say such things. And when 
offense comparable in degree results from conduct not protected by 
the first amendment (when you let your dog defecate on my front 
porch) we have no hesitation about controlling it. But where the 
harm principle collides with the free speech principle, I think the 
lower bound must be somewhat higher. 
Some racial slurs degrade the target group in the mind of the 
audience. This fourth type of harm is one the phrase "group libel" 
usually suggests: an injury to reputation.12 But what nearly all 
these cases are really about is a shade different. It is the closely 
related harm from racial vilification that is neither true nor false 
("kike," "nigger," swastikas, burning crosses) but that promotes ha-
tred or contempt. The idea is that members of the abused group 
will eventually suffer a loss of status, political power, job opportuni-
ties, and so on, when others come to view them as the speaker (and 
other speakers) have characterized them. 
If all this happens, I suppose this kind of harm is serious 
enough to justify control. The difficulty is in figuring out when any 
particular group libel has had such an effect. The harm is cumula-
tive, and the addition to societal prejudice made by a single libel is 
likely to be negligible. Moreover, the harm is long-term rather than 
immediate, and it is possible that more speech may nullify it. 
(What A says to B may be overcome by what A later says, or by 
what C says; or B may forget it.) In the third place, the harm of 
societal prejudice-assuming that it occurs in measurable incre-
ments and is not nullified by rebuttal or other events-is spread 
over all the members of the group. Whether it is thereby diffused 
(like a pollutant discharged into the air) or multiplied (like a flu 
virus) may be debated. I incline to the latter view, but with this 
reservation: it would be impossible to identify the specific individu-
als ultimately harmed by the increment of prejudice that the libel 
causes. Thus even if speech is "targeted" at a particular person, one 
must conclude that this kind of harm is not "direct" enough to 
count in Downs's system. 
12. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257-58 (1952). 
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The reservations I have about Downs's methods and conclu-
sions, though they are serious, do not negate the book's usefulness 
as a realistic study of the first amendment in action. The Skokie 
case is a hard problem, and as Judge Sprecher said, "[E]ach court 
dealing with [the case has felt] the need to apologize for its result." 
Downs may not change the results, but he helps us understand the 
need for apologies. 
A THEORY OF RIGHTS: PERSONS UNDER LAWS, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND MORALS. By Carl Wellman.1 
Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld. 1985. Pp. 225. 
$34.95. 
Ernest van den Haag2 
Rights are incessantly being manufactured in the U.S. (and on 
a global scale by the U.N.) with little thought being given to the 
nature and usefulness of the product, or the legitimacy of the manu-
facture. So I looked forward to Professor Carl Wellman's A Theory 
of Rights, thinking that he would scrutinize the process of produc-
tion. I was disappointed. 
Professor Wellman goes back to Hohfeld's distinction among 
rights, claims, privileges, powers, and immunities, not to speak of 
the correlative duties-commenting on it, clarifying it here and 
there and, perhaps, sharpening it. Herein lies his claim of original-
ity, too often reiterated. Although I do not think that Wellman's 
revisions (some acknowledging the influence of H.L.A. Hart) are 
world-shaking, his work might have been useful, were it not for his 
irritatingly repetitive style and a pedantic habit of making distinc-
tions ad infinitum, some without a difference, others conceivably of 
some use, most unneeded. Sometimes Wellman's writing borders 
on self-parody: "The core of this right, as I conceive it, is the moral 
liberty of the pregnant woman to obtain an abortion. For the sake 
of brevity, I shall use the word 'woman' somewhat loosely to refer 
to any woman or girl of child-bearing age." Must we be told that 
the liberty to obtain an abortion pertains to a "pregnant" woman 
(have others been applying?) only if she is "of child-bearing age" 
(ditto) or that "woman" may "loosely" refer to "any woman 
or girl"? Unfortunately this passage is no exception. Although 
I. Professor of Philosophy, Washington University, St. Louis. 
2. John M. Olin Professor of Jurisprudence and Public Policy, Fordham University 
School of Law. 
